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Introduction
The Inverse Elasticity Rule states that optimally chosen commodity tax rates should be inversely related to the price elasticities of demand. The Rule is usually attributed to Ramsey (1927) although a structurally equivalent formula has been derived independently by Boiteux (1956) for the problem of optimal monopoly pricing. The assumptions underlying optimal taxation in Ramsey's tradition may well be criticized from a conceptual point of view. Still, there will be no introductory course in optimal taxation that would not mention the Rule. This paper demonstrates how the Rule has to be extended if it is to guide efficient education policy in Ramsey's tradition. It is shown that the standard role taken by the elasticity of demand or supply has to be replaced with the elasticity of elasticity -also called second-order elasticity in what follows -if the Rule is to apply to education. The extended Rule calls for subsidizing education effectively if, and only if, the elasticity of the earnings function is increasing in education. In particular, the strength of subsidization should increase in the function's secondorder elasticity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model of a representative taxpayer.
Section 3 derives the extended Elasticity Rule for education. Section 4 provides the proof.
A representative-household model
The model is taken from Richter (2009). It assumes a representative taxpayer living for two periods and deriving strictly increasing utility U from consumption and strictly decreasing disutility from non-leisure time in periods i=1,2. U= is strictly quasiconcave. is identical with second-period labour supply. By contrast, only is time spent in the market, while E is time spent on education. First-period labour supply earns a 
ω E and the cost of tuition is denoted by E ϕ . The share of first-period income that is spent neither on education nor on consumption is saved:
By way of normalization, the price of consumption is set equal to one. The gross rate of return to saving is denoted by ρ . Second-period consumption is constrained by income earned:
Substituting for S in (1) and (2) yields the lifetime budget constraint:
The sole objective of this note is to extend the Inverse Elasticity Rule to education. For this purpose consideration is restricted to utility functions which are quasi linear in first-period consumption and additive in periodic sub-utilities:
The function V is strictly increasing and strictly convex. The representative taxpayer maximizes (4) in and E subject to (3). In what follows it is assumed that this constrained maximization is well behaved. This means that there exists a unique solution which is differentiable in
ω ω ρ ϕ . The first-order conditions are
Second-best policy
The government faces the need to raise an exogenous amount of revenue G. saying that each tax can well take on a negative value so that it is effectively a subsidy.
Government's net revenue has to balance the budget: 
According to (9), the wedge on education equals the difference between two ratios. The first ratio relates present returns before and after taxes and subsidies and the second ratio relates One may be eager to learn how the recommendation to subsidize education effectively translates into specific tax and subsidy rates. Unfortunately, no simple formula exists for the Ramsey framework. As one may well conjecture, the efficient set of tax and subsidy rates strongly depends on the specification of the taxpayer's utility function. There is only one known robust result. This states that qualified labour should be less distorted than nonqualified labour (Richter, 2009 ). It holds for arbitrary utility and earnings functions.
Proof
The proof is fairly straightforward. Start by simplifying the planner's problem. 
The first-order conditions with respect to 1 2 , , , L E ϕ ω are as follows:
The Lagrange multiplier γ is clearly positive. The multiplier γ even has to be greater than one if is to exceed V 
